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go.nature.com/xhunqv interest: affiliations to an institution. Managers and administrators have an apparent interest in playing down the extent of any problems at their institutions. A finding of misconduct can result in bad publicity and financial penalties, not to mention the abrupt severance of professional relationships with colleagues who are often well liked and respected.
For taxpayer-funded research, the check on these institutional conflicts of interest should be government oversight. But in many countries, such oversight is patchy or nonexistent. Even in the United States, where a federal policy mandates oversight of institutions by government funding agencies, there are clear and surprising failings -as revealed by a lawsuit that brought to light details of a misconduct investigation overseen by the US Department of Energy (DOE; see page 20). No misconduct was discovered, but errors of judgement were.
The oversight of the investigation had several problems, including that the adjudicating officials did not read the inquiry's report or keep a final copy of it, and that they approved an outcome on the basis of meetings and telephone calls with a lab manager, rather than their own scrutiny of the evidence. The officials who oversaw the investigation were the people who funded the research in the first place -again, there is an apparent conflict of interest.
DOE officials say that their actions are consistent with federal policy, but they seem disconcertingly casual about it. Important decisions were taken informally by a small group of officials and an adviser who apparently shared a common interest: to see the matter quietly resolved. The procedure ought to be more formal, better documented and even adversarial, with the institutional managers required to satisfy officials whom they do not know and who have no stake in the case outcome. This is closer to the more careful oversight of alleged misconduct by both the Office of Research Integrity at the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the inspector-general of the National Science Foundation.
No wonder policy experts are highly critical of the DOE. One influential US watchdog group, the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) in Washington DC, contacted during Nature's reporting of the failures described above, is now preparing a public letter to Steven Chu, the US energy secretary, to argue that the DOE needs a professional office of research integrity. The DOE does have an Office of Inspector General, but it typically handles more conventional alleged financial waste and fraud -not scientific misconduct, which requires specialized expertise. The National Institutes of Health (NIH), funded by the DHHS, has a much higher incidence of misconduct allegations in research than does the DOE. POGO suggests -plausibly -that this is the result of a rigorous scientific oversight system that encourages whistleblowers to come forward, rather than of any greater integrity among DOEfunded scientists.
Having an office of research integrity at the DOE could remedy this situation, and might also be politically astute. In a climate in which conservatives are looking for reasons to cut science budgets, and in which energy and climate research is a hot political topic, the DOE needs to be proactive to prevent scandals about alleged scientific misconduct escalating. One needs only to think of the bruising congressional inquiries into NIH-funded science in the 1980s to show the dangers of taking research integrity for granted.
In the meantime, DOE officials who adjudicate misconduct cases must take oversight more seriously. Their goals should be to prevent retaliation against whistleblowing scientists who have raised concerns, to ensure that those who have been unfairly accused are fairly exonerated and to reach the truth about the integrity of the science they fund. A careful look at the evidence is the first step. ■ "Officials who adjudicate misconduct cases must take oversight more seriously."
Up and away
The final mission of the space shuttle heralds difficult days for space science.
T he space shuttle is due to lift off on its final mission this week, and many scientists will cheer its departure, both from the planet and from the scene. The shuttle was key to the launch, repair and maintenance of the marvellous Hubble Space Telescope, but its contribution to science otherwise has been mediocre. Scientists often lament that the billions of dollars spent on the programme could have gone on robotic exploration of other planets, space telescopes and similar worthy causes. But they should not be too quick to welcome the demise of the shuttle. Its loss may foreshadow far darker times ahead for all space science. The shuttle's scientific programme has never lived up to the hype. In its earliest days, programme advocates made outrageous claims that experiments in space might help to tackle HIV and cancer. Recent statements have been more measured and the science more peer-reviewed, but the flight schedule for Atlantis this week shows some dispiritingly familiar and low-quality space studies: a study of microbial virulence in zero gravity, experiments on weightless mice and an iPhone kitted out with International Space Station apps.
The shuttle was never about science, of course. The Nixon-era programme was designed to give NASA a purpose and, at the time, seemed to be the logical next step: a vehicle that could make fast and cheap excursions to the beginning of space. This has proved more difficult than expected. The programme never flew close to the 50 missions per year originally envisaged, and the cost per flight was always well above the estimates. Nor could the winged orbiter fly solo, depending instead on bulky boosters and its external fuel tank to give it an extra nudge into orbit -systems that were responsible for the catastrophic loss of Challenger in 1986 and Columbia in 2003. Each accident revealed flaws in both the design and the operation of the shuttle fleet.
Yet, despite its many shortcomings, it is wrong to condemn the shuttle as a snub-nosed albatross around the neck of research. Like it or not, the space shuttle is probably the most recognized symbol of science and technology for a generation. The shuttle programme was costly, but it kept NASA focused and in the thoughts of both Congress and the public.
The fear must be that without the shuttle programme, NASA and its strong space science will wither. The agency's flagship project, the James Webb Space Telescope, is desperately over budget and likely to be delayed for years. The next Mars rover is also seeing its costs skyrocket, and officials recently stalled plans for a US-European joint mission to the red planet because of mounting budget problems. Efforts to monitor Earth have stumbled with the loss of two highprofile climate satellites in as many years.
What is particularly unfortunate about this current state of affairs is that the possibilities for space science have never been greater. Spacebased gravitational detectors could give researchers their earliest look at the Universe, and an array of space telescopes could provide insight into far-flung star systems. Closer to home, landers and rovers could teach us more about the Solar System's history and evolution, and Earth-observing satellites would improve our ability to understand and respond to climate change. Although none of these projects involves an astronaut, all require a strong and vital NASA to succeed.
Eventually, NASA may build another manned space vehicle to replace the shuttle, or it might find a mission that is more in line with the aspirations of the research community. But for now, it is an agency adrift. 
